Could St Valery disaster have been avoided?

A new book sheds more light on the surrender of the 51st Highland Division during the evacuation of British Troops in June 1940. Calum Macleod reports. A MILITARY disaster which occurred 66 years ago on Monday and saw 8000 officers and men of the 51st Highland Division surrender to the advancing Germans could have been avoided, a new book claims. On 12th June, 1940, the division was taken captive more than a week after the mass evacuation at Dunkirk. The force, under the command of Major-General Victor Fortune, had also hoped to be evacuated back to Britain from the port of St Valery-enCaux, but after German forces were able to secure a commanding position overlooking the town, it was forced to lay down its arms. But author Hugh Sebag-Montefiore has unearthed evidence which suggests the battle came close to having a very different outcome. Drawing on the first hand recollections of Major Murray Grant, second in command of the 2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders and grandfather of actor Hugh Grant, Mr Sebag-Montefiore claims the failure to support the Seaforths with anti-tank artillery was a major factor in the eventual surrender. In an excerpt from his war diary, quoted in Mr Sebag-Montefiore's book "Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man", Major Grant writes: "The position was obviously untenable against AFV (armoured fighting vehicle) attack without artillery and A/Tk (antitank support)," adding that he was sent again to HQ Division at Cailleville, to ask for this support "as a matter of urgency". Although Fortune agreed to send the guns as quickly as possible, they never arrived. Tanks of the German 7th Panzer Division commanded by General Erwin Rommel, later to win fame as the leader of the Afrika Korps, were able to break through Allied lines and occupy a dominant position on the cliff tops near Le Tot. "What's really interesting about his story is that for some reason nobody has ever picked up on it before," Mr Sebag-Montefiore said this week. "What they should have done is send down the big guns to the frontline to repulse the German attack. As a result, when Grant's outfit, the 2nd Seaforths, called for guns they couldn't get them in time and Rommel's tanks went straight through. "It was a totally chaotic time, but if General Fortune had thought it through it might have been different. "Everybody knows the Germans had this vantage point on the cliffs, but they didn't know about the guns. Who knows if the guns would have stopped them, but they could have slowed them up. All they needed was one night and the only reason the evacuation failed was because this one side of the perimeter was broken through. The rest held." The capture of such a large British force, which included elements from the Camerons, Gordons and Black Watch, as well as the Seaforths, was regarded as a defeat which could have a damaging effect on national morale and remains relatively unknown, although the incident led Inverness to adopt St Valery as one of its twin towns to ensure a permanent link between the two communities. Mr Sebag-Montefiore, however, wanted to ensure his book contained the story of the Highlanders' last stand. "It's been a struggle between me and the publisher," he admitted. "All the past, books about Dunkirk have missed out St Valery. Publishers are always in a rush to get their books out. I pleaded with the publisher to give me more time to put the St Valery section in." Another incident covered in the book is the decimation of the 1st Battalion of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders earlier in the campaign. The battalion, the last Scottish unit to wear kilts into battle, was attacked by a large force of tanks near Violaines and La Bassee. Battalion commander Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Rose-Miller sent a runner out with an order to retreat immediately, but one of his company commanders, Major Maurice Wilson, refused to accept the verbal order and sent the runner back to request confirmation in writing, delaying the evacuation. "By the time he had received the written command, it was too late to withdraw. Only 79 out of some 750 men in the battalion escaped," Mr Sebag-Montefiore said. Mr Sebag-Montefiore's source for this part of his book was a tape made by Colonel Rose-Miller and given to him by the colonel's daughter Diane. "Again, I don't think that's been mentioned before," he continued. "Errors are understandable in those circumstances, but they are still mistakes." However, LieutenantColonel Angus Fairrie of the Highlanders Museum at Fort George rejected suggestions of errors at St Valery and Violaines. "Murray Grant's memoirs were written up while he was a prisonerof-war," Colonel Fairrie explained. "He had a good four years to get on with it and not a lot else to do and it is quite different having four years to think things over from having to make decisions in the heat of battle. "It would be unfair to say General Fortune failed to send anti-tank guns because he didn't have any to send." Similarly, regarding the events surrounding the loss of the Camerons at Violaines, in a period before reliable radio communication, it made sense to ensure orders were accurate. "I don't think you could call it a mistake," he added. He also questioned how new the information was and suggested much of what Mr Sebag-Montefiore had written would already be known to members of the regiment or other historians. "Authors are always looking for a new angle," he commented. "I think he is looking for some point that people would be interested in." "Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man" by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore is published by Penguin/ Viking, price £25.